I Introduction
The rapid and large-scale growth of micro-finance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh would suggest that they have emerged as a credible alternative to the informal sector, and that MFI-members have reduced their dependence on the usurious moneylender.2 Is this observation consistent with the empirical evidence? The present research examines whether households' increased access to MFI credit has substituted for higher-cost informal credit sources.
It is traditionally argued3 that providing targeted production credit to the rural poor through microcredit schemes is likely to initiate a 'virtuous cycle' of increased household income through increased saving and investment. However, it is unlikely that MFI credit alone will kick-start the 'virtuous cycle' of perpetual growth across all households.
Successful operation of this cycle depends upon the household's human and physical capital resource (such as the size and age structure of the household, its wealth, and the market imperfections it faces), the MFI lending technology, economic opportunities within and around the village, and the macro-economic and policy environment.
Each factor, alone or in combination, affects a household's allocation of credit to specific uses.
For resource-endowed households, increased credit access may have a positive effect on their risk-bearing capacity, enhance fresh investments and encourage the adoption of new, more risky technologies to expand their enterprises. It may also alter the structure of their assets and liabilities and decrease the level of credit obtained at high cost from informal sources. On the other hand, poorer households may often face consumption crises for food and other basic non-food items, leading to steep demands for credit to increase current corisumption at the expense of future consumption (Zeller et al. 1997) .
MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in household conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size4 and insist on a fixed repayment schedule.
While an easily accessible loan may seem attractive to a cash-starved poor household, its resource profile and the wider economic and policy environment may impose limits on the marginal return to capital. Credit escalation under these circumstances increases the likelihood of cross-financing to sustain the MFI's line of credit.5 Some degree of crossfinancing is inevitable because of seasonal fluctuations in income and when coping with shocks.
Often informal loans finance MFI loans. But crossfinancing can have a deleterious effect on the household economy in the long-run if households continuously manage loan repayment without having the ability to repay Through a detailed study of informal credit transactions in a village in northern Bangladesh, the research empirically establishes that, in spite of increased outreach, MFI credit has been unable to substitute for the informal sector. Informal lenders are preferred for their local and timely access, speedy disbursement and flexible repayment. MFImember households borrow as much from informal sources as non-members of comparable groups. Target-group households, in particular, resort to extensive cross-financing of their loans: they use 89 per cent of informal loans and more than 78 per cent of MFI loans for current consumption and debt-servicing.6 The non-target group households, on the other hand, use 60 per cent of informal loans and 61 per cent of MFI loans for these two purposes. Wiig (1997) refers to this process as capital deepening which arises when additional credit is made available to current borrowers from existing institutions. Hossain (1984) and Osmani (1989) had anticipated the limits to the rate of return of capital, and therefore
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The main messages emerging from the research are that MFIs should eschew simplistic assumptions that increasing loan size ensures increased benefit across all household categories, or that households must be deriving some benefit if loan repayment rates are high. It is suggested that MEl lending technology be redesigned to be sensitive to household initial conditions. For instance, elements of formal sector lending should be incorporated for borrowers with large credit needs, greater risk-bearing capacity, an ability to provide collateral, and the skills to invest in productive enterprises. For them (i) the group contract and the joint liability system can be dispensed with, (ii) different repayment schedules devised, and (iii) loan applications screened after detailed project appraisals. On the other hand, MFIs should mimic the informal sector when lending to poorer households by accounting for seasonality and providing repayment flexibility and a ceiling on the total loan size per household. Only then can MFIs seriously compete with the informal lenders.
Structure
The rest of the article is divided into 4 sections. Section 3 describes briefly the village under study Section 4 contains a detailed discussion on credit transactions in the study village to provide a basis for the analysis, in section 5, of informal credit borrowings of MFI-member households. Section 6 summarises the main conclusions and provides suggestions for improved policy design.
Study Village
Biprabari village in Madhupur Thana, in northern Bangladesh, was purposively selected for the study to build upon earlier rounds of field work conducted since 1995 by one author in Biprabari and three adjoining villages in Madhupur. Biprabari is located on the north side of the busy Mymensingh Madhupur Road near Kakraid bazaar. According to our census (1997), the village has 92 households of expansion of self-employment, through credit escalation.
Households with less than 0.5 acre of landownersh p constitute the target group households. Not all, however, are MET members. The average household size is 4.4. Most households are nuclear units consisting of the household head (almost always the man), his wife and their children. Occasionally, the married son and his family or a widowed mother may live with the household head. A common practice is for sons and brothers to separate after marriage and set up their own house within the same bañ. A bañ is a cluster of houses where people of the same kinship group live. Households within a bañ form a mutual insurance network par excellence. Households are also members of a samaj which is a wider network to regulate social order through its leader and the community court (or shaalish).9
Non-farm activities include rickshaw pulling and work on brick kiins.
Decimal is a common unit of land measurement in the area, 100 decimals = 1 acre.
For Hindus this usually corresponds to their caste group. Muslims, who come from a certain area, recognise a common leader or a common mosque (White 1992).
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A striking feature of the rural economy is the seasonal (and uncertain) nature of the farmers' cashflow. The seasons exert a strong influence on the demand for credit because there is a considerable time lag between when expenditures are incurred on farm inputs, such as fertilisers, and when the crop is harvested and sold. This is reflected in market transactions: not only farm inputs but also food, clothing and sometimes even health services are purchased on credit to be paid off at harvest. Seasonal demands have an important bearing on the farmer credit needs in the area.
Micro-Credit Transactions in Biprabari
Madhupur has a very strong presence of memberbased MFIs providing credit. The schemes are targeted at the functionally landless rural poor, issue mostly small uncollateralised one-year term loans to individuals belonging to jointly liable peer groups, and use on-site loan disbursement and weekly collection methods by forming village organisations. Members are also required to save and deposit a certain percentage of the loan amount, which is an important source of revolving fund for the lender and an emergency fund for the borrowers.b0
Beside Grameen Bank, other well-known MFIs like ASA, BRAC, Buro-Tangail, Caritas, Proshika and SDS service the area." Not all MFIs provide credit;
we have considered only those MFIs which do.
Further, of the 54 households that are members, 5 households have not taken credit from the MFI; so only 49 member households are considered for analysis.
Sixty-four individuals from 49 households are MFI members. More than half are Grameen Bank members (Table 1) . On average, a GB member has been a member for more than 10 years. Other MFIs are recent entrants as their average membership period ranges from 1-4 years. All MFIs except SDS have a°A ll MFIs have a savings component but differ in terms of members' access to savings.
"All except Grameen Bank are NGOs. Contrary to popular view, GB is is not an NGO. It started as a pilot project of the Bangladesh Bank and was converted into a bank under a special charter in 1983.
land-based targeting criterion where the target group is defined as households owning not more than 50 decimals of land.'2 In practice, there is considerable mis-targeting. Forty per cent of MFI member households lie outside the target group. This is also reflected in the high coefficients of variation of land distribution of members.
Data on the extent of borrowings of MFI member households is provided in Table 2 . MFls have disbursed a total sum of Tk. 455,980 GB loan disbursement comprises more than 75 per cent of this amount (to 50 per cent of the total members). GB members have a large portfolio of loans which include general, seasonal, housing, tubewell and group fund loans. On average, there are 2.3 loans per GB member. This suggests a capital deepening'4 process by which current borrowers receive additional credit (Wiig 1997 "This issue has been discussed in some detail in Matin (l997b) and Zaman (1996) . ' Here capital deepening is based on proxies like membership length and on-time repayment of previous loans. lt does not necessarily have a relationship with capital building, which would arise if the successive 69 also used for these two purposes. What is the interrelationship between the informal and MFI-credit markets? Are loans from one sector financed by borrowing from the other? The central purpose of the article is to examine whether MFI membership has affected the household's recourse to informal loans. What is the extent and nature of informal borrowings of MFI-member households? Are there any inter-group variations among MFI-member households? These issues are addressed in the next section.
Informal Credit Transactions of MFI-Member Households
This section will analyse critically the informal credit transactions of MFI-member households to examïne whether they differ from those of nonmember households of comparable groups. Because of mis-targeting, the 49 MFI-member households have been categorised between target group (1G) and non-target group (NTG) households. There are 29 TG and 20 NTG households. There are significant differences between these two categories. The average landownership of category NTG is more than 14 times that of category 1G households." Landownership is an important factor affecting credit behaviour, and so it is important to examine these two groups separately despite their common MFI-membership. Table 3 shows the total and average value of informal borrowing for the two household categories.
For what purpose do households borrow from the informal market? Households borrow most often from informal sources for food consumption and loan repayment (Table 4) . Target group MFI-member households use 81 per cent of their informal loans for financing MFI and other informal loans and consumption.
While nearly one-third of NTG households' informal loans are used for household food loans led to real (physical or human) capital building.
"The average outstanding borrowing per Grameen Bank household is about Tk. 14,000 and is significantly higher than the average of other MEl-member households (less than Tk. 5000).
'Forty-five per cent of TG households are, however, landless. The average landownership per landowning household of NTG is 8 times that of TG households. (Table 5) . Availability of agricultural labour is seasonally determined and, as indicated earlier, is available annually for only 230 days in and around Biprabari. Non-farm labour comprises primarily of rickshaw pulling. While there are no barriers to entry, rickshaw pulling is characterised by low returns'7 and high seasonal fluctuations.
Thus, these households are unable to manage high levels of weekly repayment from regular income or equity Ostensibly, MET loans are meant for investing in micro-enterprises to initiate the 'virtuous cycle' of growth. But, as shown in Table 6 , more than 60 per cent of the total amount borrowed from MFIs by the target group households is diverted for consumption smoothing (28 per cent) and loan repayment purposes (35 per cent). Most of the latter are informal loans, but some could also be on-going MET loans as a result of multiple loans issued by the Grameen Bank. That is, a large proportion of MFI loans are used for internal and external crossOn average, a rickshaw puller earns more than the daily agricultural wage. But net returns are low because of maintenance costs of the rickshaw and food cost. A 70 financïng i.e. away from investment in directly productive enterprises.
Is there any evidence of inter-group variation of MFI loan use?
Use of MET loan for cross-financing by target group households ïs significantly higher (at 5 per cent) than that by the non-target group (Table 6 ). The latter, however, use a significantly high proportion (at 1 per cent) of the MFI loan for purchase of agriculture inputs and other agriculture-related purposes. This is to be expected given the significant differences in land ownership between the two groups.
The extent of cross-financing is likely to be strongly associated with capital deepening. The latter arises when current borrowers receive additional credit from existing institutions and leads to an increase in the size of weekly instalments that a borrowing household needs to manage. MFI households are divided into GB and non-GB households. GB membership is good proxy for capital deepening, since GB member households have witnessed rapid increase in the size and portfolio of loans. The results establish that older (those with more than 5 years' membership) and GB members are under a double debt burden. They borrow significant amounts from informal sources to repay MFI loans and use significant proportions of MET loans to repay their informal debts (Tables 7 and 8 ).
What are the benefits of cross-financing? How do households perceive flow of benefits from what seems to be a zero-sum game?
It has been observed that more than 60 per cent of MFI loans are used primarily for consumption smoothing and repayment of outstanding debts. Of the 22 loans which were primarily used for loan repayment, 18 were GB loans. A series of focus group discussions with different categories of borrowers was conducted to get a sense of borrowers' perceptions about the impact on their informal borrowings of MFI-membership. A summary of the discussion with women GB members is provided in the accompanying box. The borrowers' discussions revealed that most of the informal loans repaid with farm labourer usually takes food at home, hut the rickshaw puller often has to eat in the market, which erodes his gross earnings.
Summary of Discussion with Women GB Members
Women borrowers unanimously agreed that before becoming GB members, they could not and would not (deyoy nai .. anja nai) borrow from informal sources, especially on interest. No one would lend to them as they were not seen as creditworthy. They were severely credit-constrained and made do with whatever they earned. But participants also stated that they did not have the habit (obhbhash) of borrowing.
Since becoming Grameen members, the women perceived an increase in both their need and the ability to borrow from informal sources. The need to borrow is directly linked to increasing loan sizes. When the size of loans disbursed by Grameen was smaller, the need to borrow from informal sources was mainly at times of seasonal slack periods. The sums involved were also low. However, with larger and multiple loans, the need to borrow from informal sources to manage weekly instalments has become common for most borrowers. As a participant said, 'Beshi Takar Beshi Jala, Korn Takar Kam Jala' (More trouble with more money and less trouble with less).
The ability to borrow from informal lenders is coterminous with their having access to an almost assured line of (increasing amounts of) credit from Grameen. The borrowers pointed out that at times the lenders would provide additional sums to clear their Grameen dues so that the borrower could get a new Grameen loan: almost all of which would go in repaying the informal lender. Lenders would keep track of Grameen loan disbursements and even follow the borrower to the Bank on the day of the disbursement.
Grarneen loans were taken to repay earlier Grameen loans. It appears that during the GB'S generous loan regime"8, members borrowed from informal sources to maintain good repayment performance in order to borrow later still larger amounts from GB.
While MFI membership may have made the poor creditworthy, the real benefit of being able to borrow from two markets seems to lie in their ability to consistently smooth consumption. As one GB member remarked wryly, 'We were always in debt, and will always remain so. At least now we can eat three times a day'. That is, improved access to microcredit seems to have improved food consumption and nutritional status."
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The article has argued that households vary in their human and physical capital resource, and their ability to cope with risk. Credit made available by the "The average loan size per member increased from Tk. 4,670 in 1991 to Tk. 10,842 by 1994. This was mostly due to the introduction of seasonal loans in 1992.
"See also Zeller et at (1997) for empirical evidence from Madagascar and Cameroon.
It is argued that hou hold productivity depends not 71 MFI is not used for directly productive purposes by all households.'° Resource-poor households tend to use additional credit for smoothing consumption. Such credit has a low marginal return to capital, and adversely affects the household's ability to maintain regular weekly repayments. Credit escalation under these circumstances, because of a continuously increasing loan size, increases the likelihood of cross-financing from informal sources to sustain the MET's line of credit.
Cross-finance of an informal loan with another to cope with seasonal income fluctuations and other shocks is common. Often the household also borrows from the informal sector to repay the MFI loan when facing a short-term liquidity crisis. Our results suggest that non-target group MFI-member households belong to this category On average, these households own 143 decimals of land and 75 per cent of household heads are primarily occupied in self-cultivation (Table 5) . They use 18 per cent of the total value of the MFI loan for financing only on conventional productive inputs and durables, but also on skills, education, and nutri0onal and health status of its family labour (Zeller et al., 1997: 20-21) , and therefore, the use of credit for maintaining and enhancing human capital can be highly productive. Be that as it may, the present research confines itself to the direct effect of credit in increasing the households productive capital.
informal loans (Table 6 ) and 15 per cent of the total value of informal loans for financing MFI loans. That is, the level of cross-financing is low as these households generally have an assured income source.
But cross-financing can have a deleterious effect on the household economy in the long run if resourcepoor (i.e. target group MFI-member) households continuously manage loan repayment without having the ability to repay There is no in-built mechanism2' in the present state of the lending technology that distinguishes between borrowers who continuously cross-finance to manage repayment and those borrowing across sectors to manage short-term liquidity problems. The target group MF1-member households own less than 10 decimals on average, and nearly 60 per cent of household heads depend primarily on seasonally fluctuating wage labour (Table 5) . They are more likely to need to regularly finance their MEl loans with informal loans. As evident, they use 45 per cent of their informal borrowings for financing MFI loans (Table 4) , and 35 per cent of the MFI loan value for financing informal loans (Table 6 ). Differences in the extent of use of informal and MFI loans between target group and non-target group MFI-member households is depicted in Figures 1 and 2. High levels of cross-financing deplete the capital of the loan, and reduce the value of the new loan that is used to repay or service the old. The process turns into a 'vicious cycle' as smaller investments into directly productive enterprises yield less returns, thus requiring even higher loans the next time to repay the original loan. It erodes the profitability of any enterprise, especially if a high interest loan is taken from the informal market.
Cross-financing can be sustained when loan sizes remain small, But most MFIs put borrowers ort a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size so that borrowers who manage to repay a small loan are eligible to receive a larger loan the next time.
There is little screening of loan applications by MFIs and members end up borrowing more than they
In a group contract, members are expected to screen each other's loan applications. This does not happen in practice since members screen the person and not the project. If a member is reliable and trustworthy, she can 72 can repay Poor screening seems to be a direct consequence of credit escalation. The number of members at a GB centre for instance, has increased from 20 to 35-40, and each borrower in Biprabari on average has 1.83 loans (excluding the housing loans) of average size 1k. 6,594 and maturing at different times. While overall the growth in the number of branches and centres has declined between 1986 and 1994, the expansion in the number of groups has been stable. The total (cumulative) disbursement expanded about 32-fold between 1986 and 1993. This rapid expansion was fuelled by the growth of average annual lending per branch from Tk. 1.86 million in 1986 to 1k. 14.59 million in 1994 (Khandker et al. 1995) , and is likely to have greatly reduced the monitoring capability of the field worker. Repayment of the previous loan is the only criterion for assessing both the ability and the willingness of the borrower to repay This could lead to delinquency An easily accessible loan is always attractive to a cash-starved and indebted poor household, its resource profile and the wider economic and policy environment impose limits on the marginal return to capital. Over an extended period, the returns on activities financed by MFIs are also likely to decrease, given demand constraints, as more and more people join the programme and undertake similar activities (Khandker et al. 1995) . Credit escalation, accompanied by a fixed repayment schedule, extracts more capital than the household's earnings, and can lead to the inevitable collapse of the system.2' lt clearly emerges that MFIs should eschew simplistic assumptions that increasing loan size ensures increased benefit across all household categories, or that households must be deriving some benefit if loan repayment rates are high. Increasing loan sizes puts additional debt burden on MEl-member households. The burden is particularly heavy for target group households whose access to economic opportunities within and outside the village is constrained by its limited human capital resource and the macro-economic environment. Often large loan borrow unusually large amounts.
Collapse of the joint liability contract in Madhupur has been analysed by Matin (1997a). sizes compel households to borrow from informal sources to service the MFI-loans.23 This is corroborated by another recent study of the Grameen Bank (Rahman 1997: 2) Loan disbursement increased more than threefold between 1991 and 1994. The pressure from fellow members and coercion from bank workers for regular weekly repayment burdens many women to accept different types of loans from Grameen Bank and informal sources in order to maintain the regularities of weekly repayment of instalments on previous loans. Such lending process itself leads to a spiraling debt cycle in which many members in the study area feel they are trapped.
It is also evident that there is no direct relationship between high repayment rates and household welfare. A high repayment rate of MFI loans may be maintained through cross-financing from the informal sector.
7 What is to be Done?
MFIs have provided credit access, by designing a standard product, to a large number of borrowers who would not otherwise be served. However, there is an urgent need to redesign the MET lending technology to make it sensitive to household initial conditions. An inflexible technology is unable to meet the needs of borrowers at opposite ends of the economic scale.
For instance, MFIs should consider individual-liability lending to long-time borrowers with good repayment record and who now borrow large sums. Many of them are likely to belong to the non-target group with large credit needs, greater risk-bearing capacity, an ability to provide collateral, and the necessary entrepreneurial skills to invest in productive enterprises. For them (j) the group contract and ' The average instalment size of target group MOI households is Tk. 209 against Tk. 195 of non-target group MOI households. In spite of considerable differences in household resources, the difference in average weekly repayment is not significant.
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the joint liability system can be dispensed with, (ii) different repayment schedules devised, and (iii) loan applications screened after detailed project appraisals. Households belonging to this category have access to physical collateral (most often land) and do not need to be bound by the terms of social collateral in the form of groups. They use MFI loans for investment in productive enterprises with long gestation periods and so may prefer a monthly (or sometimes longer) repayment schedule. Further, loan applications of larger borrowers should he screened carefully to assess the economic viability of the enterprise. While these measures are likely to reduce the overhead costs of níembership mobilisation, borrowers' transaction costs and the administrative costs of lending,2 more importantly, they would create the right incentives for larger and regular borrowers to maintain high repayment rates.
On the other hand, MFIs should mimic the informal sector when lending to poorer target group households by allowing for seasonality and providing repayment flexibility and a ceiling on total loan size per household. These households borrow small amounts, often in kind and are under severe dietary stress during the agricultural lean seasons. It is during these slack periods that they often run into MEIs can seriously compete with informal lenders and provide a real choice to MFI-member households only by designing a differentiated and diverse lending technology sensitive to household resource endowments.
These outcomes were also suggested by Khandker et al. (1995) but the authors based their observations on branch-level data and did not address the impact on repayment incentives 1 For households with members belonging to more than one MFI, the date of first joining has been used to determine household membership. 2 Households with less than 50 decimals of land are included within the target group 3 Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation. 4 SDS is a savings-based organisation with no land-based restrictions on membership. 
